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Abstract 
 
This survey article provides a brief but comprehensive overview of microfinance academic 
literature with emphasis on recent innovations, trends and efficiency. In particular, we focus 
on controversial issues of microfinance, such as commercialization, regulation, interest rate 
policy and the balance between outreach and performance of MFIs. In summary, the findings 
of the reviewed literature underline the great improvement in the microfinance field that, 
however, has not reached its full potential yet. At the same time, we outline potential risks and 
drawbacks which are being discovered along the way of microfinance development and 
maturing, many of which still waiting for more rigorous scholarly examination. The paper 
also contains an illustrative econometric model of the relation between social and financial 
efficiency. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Governments, as well as the international organizations, struggle to lower the number of 
people who live at subsistance level or below it. Besides the subsidy or social programs for 
the low-income inhabitants, there is financial help based on microfinance services for more 
than 30 years now. Original target of the microfinance institutions (MFIs) - to offer low-
capacity credits for starting entrepreneurs with insufficient credit score  or missing financial 
security was extended to other products such as microinsurance, saving or payments. MFIs 
administrated credits for 89 million clients in the price of 99 billion USD all over the world in 
2012 (mixmarket.org). Although according to the evaluating Human Development Report for 
2013 the percentage of the poorest - “core poor” - is relatively decreasing, nowadays, there 
are over 1.56 billion inhabitants who are not able to extricate themselves from the vicious 
circle of poverty. 
The aim of this summarizing article is to continue in previous summarizing studies of 
Matin et al. (2002), Woller (2002) or Brau and Woller (2004) with the orientation to the basic 
developmental tendencies and controversial issues of microfinance in the world academic 
literature. 
First, we will clarify why the microfinance has become so popular and what is their 
contribution in comparison with the direct financing. Then, we will summarize current 
innovative approaches connected to this sector and show why the general paradigm 
identifying microfinance as an effective instrument of decreasing poverty can be sometimes 
misleading. Another part will be focused on the general challenges that the microfinance 
industry is facing and that are not definitely answered by the existing theoretical or empirical 
studies. We will concentrate mainly on the matter of financial and social effectiveness where 
we will extend our existing conclusion to the empirical analysis applied on panel data. 
Finally, we will introduce the results of our research and generalize some findings for further 
possible research. 
 
2. MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION 
 
Long-time effort of many governments to solve the problems of the inhabitants living in the 
poverty led to many social programs which financed business activities of low-income people 
(usually farmers) in the developing countries. This business model of the direct financing, 
through state-owned banks, was proved to be very expensive and in the most cases ineffective 
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(Cull et al., 2009). According to Helms (2006) the reason of failure of the direct financing is 
in insufficient emphasis of the government during the decisive process of the credit program 
which leads to the choice of the target object with the political connections or the higher 
income. Government loans are often understood as a donation by their receivers which leads 
to the effort to postpone their repayment. Another problem of the direct financing is the cost 
of the credit which is determined under the level of the market interest rate and it does not 
cover even the invested expenses. Finally, Helms (2006) is pointing out the lacking services 
(e.g. saving or payments) and unsatisfactory flexibility of the credit programs which are 
predominantly limited in their orientation to a particular sector, a region or a segment. 
More complex solution to this problem was discovered around 1980 when Mohammad 
Yunus (the founder of Grameen Bank) introduced to the world a revolutionary approach in 
the financing method of the low-income inhabitants. Basis of this innovative microfinance 
product is in the low credit amount provided not to an individual but to a homogeneous group 
of people, usually to women (Morduch, 2000; Bauer et al., 2012). For the debtor there was an 
advantage that he/she could get higher credit, which he/she would not get as an individual 
applicant. MFIs have the possibility to reduce the risk of information asymmetry which is 
passed to the group members as well as the control of the term keeping of the provided credit. 
The second important step was the change of the financial purpose. Projects aimed to the 
agriculture were temporarily replaced by group credits for financing small shops, handcraft 
shops and cattle farming with the aim to minimize the risks connected with credit repayment. 
These branches were proved to be more stable and less susceptible to seasonal variation than 
agriculture (Cull et al., 2009). 
Realized changes in the debtor’s financing brought high returns of repaid loans (up to 98 
%), and also positive impact on the poor inhabitants (Morduch, 1999b; Khandker, 2005). The 
changes also convinced the government institutions to allocate high percentage of the public 
expenses into microfinance industry and support the social effectiveness of MFIs. 
New stage of microfinance development financed from the public expenses shows that it 
will be unsustainable in the long term because it creates permanent stress on the state budget 
and even does not cover enough growing requirements on the financing sources of MFIs. 
There are determined the legislative rules in the individual countries which enable the 
transformation of the MFIs from the non-profit organizations to the profitable organizations. 
The reason for this is the effort to increase the financial effectiveness of these institutions and 
give the preference to financing with own sources, alternatively to use external sources on the 
interbank market. 
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The final effect of the changes mentioned above has a considerable share on the rapidity 
of the microfinance sector progress. The sufficiency of financing sources and appropriate 
legal regulation can be seen on the growing number of the MFIs. While in 2000 there were 
registered 221 MFIs, in 2012 their number rose up to 1055 (mixmarket.org). It is obvious 
from the Chart 1 that from the point of MFIs number is the biggest microfinance region Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the long term, followed by sub-Saharan Africa (Africa) and 
Asia. States of North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) show slower development, mainly 
due to the lacking capital, insufficient market transparency and religious and cultural 
traditions. 
 
Chart 1: Overview of the number of the MFIs among individual regions 
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Note: EAP – East Asia and the Pacific, ECA – East and Central Asia, LAC – Latin America and the Caribbean, 
MENA – North Africa and the Middle East, SA – South Asia 
Source: mixmarket.org 
 
 
Besides the growing number of MFIs, the microfinance market is getting larger (Chart 2). 
Since 2010 is the largest market in East Asia and the Pacific, followed by Latin America and 
the Caribbean (measured by the amount of the assets). The reason of this is China which 
strongly supports microfinance programs aimed mainly to the agriculture in the last three 
years. Local MFIs administrated assets in the total amount of 45 billion USD in 2012, out of 
this 93 % is held by four profitable MFIs. 
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Chart 2: The size of the microfinance sector according to the amount of the assets (billion 
USD)
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Note: EAP – East Asia and the Pacific, ECA – East and Central Asia, LAC – Latin America and the Caribbean, 
MENA – North Africa and the Middle East, SA – South Asia 
Source: mixmarket.org 
 
 
The rapidity of the development of the microfinance industry is influencing also the new 
products and technologies which are in the most cases comparable to the bank sector. Despite 
this unquestionable success of microfinance, we will show in the following parts that 
innovations and trends which are currently the most distinctive on the microfinance market 
change microfinance culture dynamically and cannot be taken definitely as a positive step 
ahead. 
 
3. TRENDS, INNOVATIONS, OR A PROBLEM? 
 
More detailed analysis of the current trends in microfinance are in Sengupta and Aubuchon 
(2008), Kono and Takahashi (2010), Armendariz and Morduch (2010), or Barry (2012). We 
will try to partly generalize it, extend it and emphasize possible risks and deficiency which 
may appear in the future. 
 
3.1 COMMERCIALIZATION OF MFIs 
 
The most distinctive controversial change is represented by the enormous growth in the 
numbers of profitable MFIs. These institutions are founded as profitable or many countries 
allow their transformation from the non-profit institutions. Such a big first transformation 
occurred in 1992 in Bolivia (BancoSol) and had immediately many followers all over the 
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world. Nowadays, there are around 463 profitable MFIs on the microfinance market 
administrating assets in the value of 104 billion USD. For the comparison, there were 
registered around 592 non-profit MFIs according to the mixmarket.org in 2012 all over the 
world and their assets were a little less than 27 billion USD. 
The reason of the change of the MFIs proprietary structure consists mainly in the growth 
of the sources of the financial business activities, in the extension of the product portfolio, 
possibility of more rapid development or permission to the employees to be co-owners of the 
particular institution (Lauer, 2008; Chahine and Tannier, 2010). At the same time, authors are 
pointing out that the change of the proprietary structure can create a strong pressure on the 
social effectiveness, meaning the preference of the creditworthy debtors, or so called mission 
drift. 
Coleman (2006) and Ghalib (2013) made a more detailed analysis of the portfolio quality 
of the chosen MFIs debtors in Thailand and Pakistan. The final results proves that even 
though credit offer leads to the increase of the living standards of the inhabitants, the target 
group did not consist of the very poor people but there were deliberately chosen the less poor 
clients. Ghalib (2013) discovers that the analyzed portfolios of the MFIs contain 40 % of the 
least poor and only 22 % of the poorest, so called core poor. The cause of the mission drift 
must be argued in the wider economical connections and we will study it in more detail in the 
section 4.5. 
 
3.2 NEW GENERATION OF THE PRODUCTS AND TECHNOLOGIES 
 
Modern microfinancing is not bound today only to the need to finance business activities by 
means of credit but it also extends to the demand of saving products, or the solution of 
financial transactions with payments. Morduch (1999b) and Atkinson et al. (2013) discover 
that thanks to the combination of the credit and saving, it is possible to increase the payment 
moral of the debtor and also achieve higher probability of the credit repayment. 
Innovative changes concern also the credit offer. Standard group credit is offered in 
different forms, usually varying in the number of members, form of the credit allocation, or 
possible security. At the same time, there are growing debtor numbers who use credit for non-
specific purposes. According to Karlan and Zinman (2010) is this type of the credit very 
beneficial for the debtors regardless of its higher price and non-business purpose. The last 
form is the credit offered to the individuals, not to the groups. 
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Individual credit is popular mainly with the profitable MFIs due to its higher profitability 
and possibility to require better financial security from the debtor. Armendariz and Morduch 
(2000) state that while group credits are offered up to 1 000 USD, individual loans can be 
from 2 000 to 5 000 USD. This type of credit can create on the client’s side unique 
opportunity to reach higher lever effect for the financing of his own intention and at the same 
time to reduce costs emerging from the necessity of the mutual control among the group 
debtors. 
Growing demand for individual credits is judged critically by Cull et al. (2007), Hermes 
and Lensink (2007) and Mersland and Størm (2009). The authors agreed on the fact that MFIs 
providing individual credits have higher ratio of more creditworthy debtors in their portfolio 
and due to it they reach lower social effectiveness rate. Hermes and Lensink (2007) also warn 
that the demand for individual credits in more susceptible to the change of the interest rate 
than group credit. 
Another innovation represents evaluation method of the credit applicants. There are 
started to be used a credit databases in some regions which are shared by the MFIs and they 
have better awareness of the debtor payment morale. Although among public there are 
concerns about higher initial expenses for creating databases, the most of the existing studies 
incline rather to their establishment (De Janvry et al., 2010; Van Gool et al., 2012). 
Separate research field is the microinsurance. Even though existing studies does not pay 
much attention to the insurance products, we should remind the works of Werner (2009) or 
Biener and Eling (2011). Biener and Eling (2011) made the first more complex analysis with 
the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) model studying the effectiveness degree of the 
microinsurance programs in Africa, Asia and Latin America in 2004-2008. Their final 
findings recommend to offer this product more to the group than to the individuals due to the 
lower transaction costs expended on the risk minimization of the information asymmetry. 
Their study also revealed that the microinsurance is more lucrative for the profitable MFIs 
due to the more frequent usage of technological apparatus. 
 
3.3 COMPETITION 
 
We will begin the overview of the existing conclusions concerning the competition among 
MFIs with the work of Mallick (2012) where was with the help of microfinance market 
analysis in Bangladesh discovered that the increasing number of the formal MFIs does not 
lead to an elimination of non-formal lenders (usurers), but on the contrary, it supports their 
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expansion meaning the growth of their interest rate for the clients. Knight et al. (2009), 
Sodokin and Donou-Adonsou (2010), Vanroose and D´Espallier (2013) or Cull et al. 
(forthcoming) were discovering possible influence of the bank sector to the future 
development of microfinance industry. Whereas Knight et al. (2009) and Sodokin and Donou-
Adonsou (2010) admit possible cooperation between MFIs and commercial banks, Vanroose 
and D´Espallier (2013) or Cull et al. (forthcoming) can see the space for the future 
development of MFIs more in the fields with insufficiently developed financial sector. Both 
studies admit in their recommendations that in the places with higher concentration of 
financial institutions are MFIs pushed to prefer low-income inhabitants. 
The most controversial impact of the competition is seen by the experts in the relation to 
the clients. Sengupta and Aubuchon (2008) warn that with the growing competition among 
MFIs, there is not only the decrease of MFIs effectiveness (due to the lower subsidy) but also 
the decrease of debtor’s payment morale. McIntosh and Wydick (2005) and McIntosh et al. 
(2005) are discovering in their findings that with the growing number of the MFIs, the clients 
have the tendency to lend money at more MFIs at the same time, alternatively they have less 
tendency to save. Overindebtedness is the consequence mainly of debtor’s financial literacy 
and lacking credit databases in the most of microfinance regions. Finally, Guha and 
Chowdhury (2013) are pointing out the relation between overindebtedness and the credit 
price. While earlier studies of Fernando (2006) or Porteous (2006) admit the possibility of 
decrease of the credit rate interest, Guha and Chowdhury (2013) are concerned about the fact 
that higher risk associated with the overindebtness will push the MFIs to increase these rates. 
 
3.4 ALTERNATIVE FINANCIAL SOURCES 
 
Initial development of the microfinance sector financed from the public sources is gradually 
substituted by the debt instruments, such as credits on the interbank market, bond issues or 
subordinate debt. Creditors are not only the governments of the particular countries but also 
international organizations, institutional investors, commercial banks or individual objects. In 
some regions prevails financing from the own sources or there are used client deposit. It is 
necessary for this purpose that the MFIs are subordinate to regulation of the central bank or 
other supervising bureau. 
The subsidy purposefulness brings more rapid development according to Morduch 
(1999a) or Hudon and Traca (2011). In accordance with their opinion the subsidy policy 
should be proportional to the needs of MFIs and should not exceed a border where it shows 
 9 
ineffectiveness. According to D´Espallier et al. (2013) the worldwide lacking financial 
support is shown in the decrease of the social effectiveness. Most often it is the increase of 
client’s interest rate, the more creditworthy debtors preference or decrease of women share in 
credit portfolios. 
The second most important way of MFIs financing is external source. Besides the 
standard credit, bond issue or assets securitization, it is effective to get financial sources in the 
form of the public subscription share in a particular company. Quite recent IPO, in Mexico in 
2007 (2 billion USD) and in India in 2010 (1.5 billion USD), surpassed all expectations and it 
ensured to the given MFIs the enormous growth of clients and also size of credit portfolio 
(Rosenberg, 2007; Chen et al., 2010). Critics are warning that these activities lead to the 
significant growth of microfinance rate interests for the clients and as a consequence damage 
the good reputation of microfinance and their purpose (Cull et al., 2009). 
The reason of higher interest in microfinance sector from the investors is quite simple. 
Poverty is becoming profitable industry. MFIs lent over 80 billion USD all over the world in 
2006-2012, out of it 54 billion USD were aimed to the profitable MFIs. Janda and Svárovská 
(2010) and Janda et al. (forthcoming) verified that it is possible to reach the profit comparable 
to other debt instruments and appropriately diversify the investment portfolio by investment 
into microfinance industry. 
The last alternative financing source involves own sources and financial funds saved on 
saving accounts at MFIs. The use of the internal sources is not released regularly and due to it 
the academic public does not pay attention to it. The existing conclusions show that internal 
financing has a positive influence on the business activities of MFIs. Institutions which are 
financed by these sources have better results in providing credits and are more oriented to the 
social aims in the long term than if they rely only on the subsidies (Hollis and Sweetman, 
1998; Hamada, 2010). 
 
3.5 GLOBALIZATION OF MICROFINANCE MARKET 
 
Process of increasing economic integration among particular countries is accompanied by 
whole range of sources of financing, MFIs participation in international organizations 
(FINCA, Women’s World Banking...), up to performing business activities in more countries 
of the world or to organizational structure comprising foreign entities.  Mersland et al. (2011) 
analyze these factors in 73 countries of the world during the years 2001 - 2008. Conclusions 
of their regressive analysis prove the positive impact of international involvement on social 
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efficiency of MFIs. These MFIs rather tend to offer credits to women, but do not focus on 
rural areas for their business activities, because of higher costs. On the other hand, no link 
between international influence and financial efficiency has been proved. The reason is that 
foreign management can require higher incomes or that clearly defined business model is 
missing when founding the particular MFI. 
Certain degree of skepticism in globalization of microfinance sector is expressed by 
Dokulilová et al. (2009), Garmaise and Natividad (2013), Wagner (2012) and Wagner with 
Winkler (2013). Garmaise and Natividad (2013) argue in their conclusions that MFIs in host 
countries can reach cheaper sources of financing if their mother organization is politically 
related to their homeland. However, these cheaper sources do not show higher degree of 
social efficiency but they show increase in profit margins, number of staff or increase in non-
purpose loans. 
Wagner (2012) and Wagner with Winkler (2013) warn about increasing instability of 
microfinance sector and its higher susceptibility to market upheavals, especially in connection 
with the financial crisis in 2008. Many MFIs faced heavy losses from provided credits and in 
the upshot some of them had to finish their activities. Similar scenario took place also in India 
in 2010. Due to bad control of risks and due to the credit boom, the Indian microfinance 
sector fell into trap leading to the largest microfinance crisis in the history so called „Andhra 
Pradesh Crisis” (Mader a Winkler, 2013). 
 
4. FUTURE CHALLLENGES 
 
This part will identify the main challenges, which the microfinance sector is facing nowadays.  
It will deal especially with the issue of new products and services, policy of interest rates, 
regulation and supervision, human resources management and so called mission drift. 
 
4.1 NEW PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
 
Apart from the possibility of financing housing or ecological projects, there is a great future in 
insurance products. Considerable part of population in developing countries is exposed to the 
risk of injury or disease that can cause unexpected expenses on drugs or doctor’s appointment. 
According to Leatherman et al. (2013) these expenses can vary in some countries ranging 
between 20 to 70% of income. Current product of microinsurance dealing rather with long-
term incapacity for work or death could be gradually enriched with health insurance. 
 11 
Alternative distribution channels (cash dispensers, micro kiosk or movable kiosk) will be 
of great importance for providing microfinance services. Especially m-finance enabling 
clients the contact with bank via mobile phone is becoming popular. On the other hand, MFIs 
give opportunity to reduce operating costs and appeal to more clients with the product offer 
within shorter space of time. Disadvantages preventing m-finance from faster spreading 
consist in high up-front costs and range of conditions that are impossible for MFIs to 
complete in the medium term (Kapoor et al., 2007; Kumar et al., 2010). 
Another challenge is represented by an alternative way of financing projects by means of 
platforms such as Kiva or Prosper. These platforms have indisputable advantage of possibility 
to appeal to high number of investors all over the world, who want to participate in direct 
financing of ring-fenced business plans chosen in advance. Although these online platforms 
can differ depending on business model, regulation or way of cooperation with MFIs, the 
principle remains the same: to choose interesting projects with suitable investors (Burand, 
2009; Galak et al., 2011). 
 
4.2 POLICY OF INTEREST RATES 
 
Policy of MFIs interest rates faces two general types of criticism. On one hand, the public 
believe that interest rates amount is excessively high and does not reflect social goal which 
the microcredits are intended for. On the other hand, there is prevailing opinion that the 
amount of interest rates is inefficiently subsidized from public resources and may 
disadvantage those MFIs that do not receive it. 
According to Rosenberg et al. (2013) the degree of microfinance interest rates was 
decreasing in the long term up to the year of 2007, when it stabilized because of financial 
crisis and also because of the growth of operating costs and costs for financing credit. Their 
report also mentions that average amount of microfinance interest rates is estimated at 27% 
p.a. and it is even higher at profitable MFIs in the long term. On top of that, Sandberg (2013) 
and Harper (2012) are confident that MFIs proceed correctly when determining these 
microfinance interest rates and that their height reflects the height of expenses and degree of 
risk to which these institutions are put at. 
Karlan and Zinman (2008) analyze debtors’ reactions to change of microfinance interest 
rates that can be, according to politicians, increased without decrease of demand for credits. 
Potential increase in the price of credit can compensate subsidy expenses from public budgets. 
However, Karlan and Zinman (2008) disprove this surmise. Their analysis that was carried 
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out on consumer credits shows that the growth of rates above particular limit results not only 
in decrease of demand but also in deterioration of credit returns (especially for women). 
What’s more, MFIs will not make higher profits with the policy of higher interest rates either. 
Roberts (2013) also came to the same conclusion. He was studying relation between price of 
credit and amount of profit at profitable MFIs. Finally Karlan and Zinman (2008) add, that the 
change in due period of credit is more important than its price for relatively poor debtors. 
Dehejia et al. (2012) made similar study as Karlan and Zinman (2008) did, and they also 
confirm that debtors are more sensitive to changes of interest rates. Their demand is mainly 
focused on smaller amounts and more frequent loans. Growth of credit price can result in 
higher rate of profitability but at the expense of decreasing social efficiency. The reason is 
that MFIs tend to prefer more solvent debtors as the interest rates increase. 
 
4.3 OPTIMAL RATE OF (NON-) REGULATION 
 
Another unclear question deals with role of the state and degree of its task to regulate and 
supervise the microfinance market. Most of studies admit the role of regulation MFIs, 
particularly because of better management of credit risk, larger transparency and necessity of 
supervision of administration of the client’s deposits. However, Cull et al. (2011) points out 
that regulation can be significantly expensive especially in initial stage when setting the 
reporting or training of authorized employees is required. MFIs can respond to such expenses 
with increasing price of credits or with increasing amount of credits. Target segment is the 
one who will feel these effects in the upshot. More findings are brought by Hartarska a 
Nadolnyak (2007) a Mersland a Strøm (2009). Both of these performed studies note that 
introducing regulation does not affect neither improvement of social efficiency nor 
acceleration of future development. 
 
4.4 HUMAN RESOURCES 
 
The importance of human resources quality, especially in top management is discussed by 
Ghani and Mahmood (2011), Galema et al. (2012) and Randøy et al. (forthcoming). Ghani 
and Mahmood (2011) point out the analysis that was carried out in Pakistan, where the 
missing market orientation of the company officers and low motivation of subordinate 
employees caused the insufficient development of microfinance sector. Galema et al. (2012) 
refer to recent example of financial crisis in India, where the top officials of NGOs have more 
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freedom in their decisions than it is common in other types of MFIs. These powers then create 
excessive risk rate that requires accelerated rectification on the part of governmental 
authority. 
Hartarska (2005) and Mersland and Strøm (2009) investigate efficiency of high office 
division and structure of top management of particular MFIs. Hartarska (2005) came to the 
conclusion that managing board consisting mainly of employees represents greater 
contribution for MFIs in achievement of financial development.  Mersland and Strøm (2009) 
argue that it is necessary to prevent general manager to hold an office of chairman of the 
board and vice versa. They also claim it is essential to prefer women as COE or to provide 
individual form of credit for the target segment. Observing these rules cause positive effect on 
resultant profit of MFIs. 
 
4.5 MISSION DRIFT 
 
The most controversial topic of microfinance is the balance between social and financial 
efficiency. Achievement of social aims lies in offering credits to the poorest inhabitants 
provided that (non-market) interest rates remain low. On the other hand, financial efficiency 
reflects price of credit that covers invested costs increased by adequate profit without 
necessity of subsidies from external counterparties. 
However, it is becoming apparent that this theoretical concept is considerably full of 
problems as financing of core poor poses high operating and transactional costs for MFIs. 
These costs cannot be simply reflected in amount of interest rates because credit amount of 
group credit is usually very low (Rosenberg et al. 2013). 
Commercialization of microfinance sector and the need of self-financing forces MFIs to 
prefer more solvent debtors and to secure them faster development. Drift towards richer 
clients so called “mission drift” creates in professional literature two different approaches to 
balance between financial and social efficiency. Supporters of fulfilling financial aims claim 
that it is impossible to achieve social efficiency without preference of more solvent debtors 
and long-term financial stability. They also add that positive correlation between social and 
financial efficiency exists. On the other hand, others are of that opinion that mission drift 
suppress social purpose for which the microfinance originated and it is not advisable to move 
away from it in the long term. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) come to the conclusion that moderate positive correlation 
between financial and social efficiency exists. Higher degree of social efficiency is detectable 
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in NGO rather than in other types of MFIs. Authors analyzed conclusion of the research for 
one-year period using DEA model. 
Mersland and Strøm (2010) carry out more complex analysis using panel regression. Their 
comparison of social efficiency measured by average amount of credit and of financial 
efficiency observed on average amount of costs and profitability did not confirm the fact that 
MFIs could prefer more solvent debtors. It is quite the other way around as it is becoming 
apparent that higher financial efficiency of these institutions can subsequently lead to better 
fulfillment of social tasks. Authors also find out that average amount of credit is rather 
influenced by amount of costs than amount of profit. 
Quayes (2012) partly admits the contradiction between financial and social efficiency 
depending on the level of MFIs transparency (discourse level). Although primary findings of 
his regressive model do not yield any statistically important conclusions, by adjusting this 
model there is a positive influence between financial and social efficiency at MFIs depending 
on high degree of transparency. On the other hand, low degree of transparency at MFIs lead to 
compromise between mentioned variables. Louis et al. (2013) apply different methods to the 
same intention. The method should reveal possible discrepancy between social and financial 
efficiency. Method SOM (Self-Organizing Maps) applied to selected one-year sample of data 
points out the important positive reciprocity between social and financial aims. 
Mosley a Hulme (1998), Cull et al. (2007), Hermes et al. (2011) a Hartarska et al. (2013) 
oppose the studies mentioned above. The first extensive study Cull et al. (2007) think that 
type of microcredit is the cause of deflection towards higher financial efficiency. MFIs 
providing individual credits reach higher rate of profitability at the expense of decline 
percentage of women in credit portfolios and social efficiency. On the other hand, institutions 
concentrating on group credits do not show such deflection. MFIs that can reach both aims 
can be found as well. Their regressive model confirms that growth of charges, or more 
precisely price of credits, do not have to appear in higher profitability of MFIs. 
Hermes et al. (2011) carry out an analysis of efficiency using the method of SFA 
(Stochastic Frontier Analysis) on selected sample 435 MFIs in the years 1997-2007. 
Conclusions show negative correlation between social and financial efficiency. MFIs can aim 
at poorer population only at the expense of higher costs and lower profitability. Financial 
efficiency appears only on condition of more solvent debtor’s preferences.  Hartarska et al. 
(2013) only add that MFIs that aim to increase social efficiency should focus more on 
achieving maximum reduction of costs. 
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5. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE BETWEEN SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL 
EFFICIENCY 
 
Selected past conclusions regarding social and financial efficiency are illustrated in following 
part on panel data of selected MFIs from region of southern and south-eastern Asia and Latin 
America and Caribbean (LAC). Given studied area is further widened by macroeconomic 
perspective that is considered important especially by Ahlin et al. (2011) and Janda and Zetek 
(forthcoming). 
 
5.1 DATA 
 
Representative sample of data to selected MFIs is downloaded from mixmarket.org. Missing 
variables or irrelevant figures were completed by weighted average from previous period 
where the weight coefficient represents the amount of MFI debtors. Macroeconomic data to 
individual countries are copied from the website of International Monetary Fund or from the 
website of World Bank, alternatively from Transparency International. Total number of used 
variables in the period of 2006-2012 is showed in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: General Description of Variables 
    LAC ASIA 
Variable General Definition 
Number of 
Observ. 
Mean 
Standard  
Dev. 
Median 
Number of 
Observ. 
Mean 
Standard  
Dev. 
Median 
GDP Gross Domestic 
Product (% change) 
1936 4.4960 2.9540 4.4800 1239 6.2214 2.5418 6.1800 
Inflation Inflation, average 
consumer prices (% 
change) 
1936 5.3143 3.1843 4.3000 1239 8.0929 4.1735 7.6400 
Export Export volume of 
goods and services (% 
change) 
1936 4.1828 6.9622 3.4600 1239 6.7089 10.562 9.6200 
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Urban_ln Urban population in 
individual country 
(abs.) 
1936 16.628 1.1973 16.170 1239 17.819 1.6279 17.613 
Legal Index of corruption in a 
individual country (0-
10) 
1936 3.1460 0.6267 3.2000 1239 2.7031 0.5112 2.5000 
ALB_B Average Loan Balance 
per Borrower (USD) 
1936 1634.6 3315.5 903.00 1239 305.34 517.54 147.00 
Number_ln Number of active 
borrowers in MFI (abs.) 
1936 9.2117 1.6763 9.1573 1239 10.614 1.7888 10.600 
Yield_R Real yield on gross 
loan portfolio of MFI 
(%) 
1936 30.284 21.581 24.160 1239 18.855 14.012 15.250 
PAR_90 Portfolio at risk > 90 
days (%) 
1936 4.9892 7.3713 3.1050 1239 5.5454 11.373 1.8400 
TE/TA Total Expense / Total 
Assets of MFIs (%) 
1936 29.647 18.385 24.140 1239 21.861 12.491 19.250 
Source: mixmarket.org, worldbank.org, imf.org, transparency.org 
 
First indicator GDP shows year-on-year change of gross domestic product that is used as 
proxi indicator of country development. It is supposed that year-on-year growth will have 
positive impact on microfinance sector. Another indicator Inflation shows year-on-year 
change of price level measured by consumer price index. Macroeconomic perspective is 
further widened by indicator of economy openness in specific country (Export), where MFIs 
is. Indicator Urban_ln shows logarithm of total number of population in specific country 
living in cities. A lot of MFIs do not focus only on rural regions where higher rate of 
profitability is not guaranteed (Janda and Turbat, 20013) but establish branches in city 
districts with relatively higher purchasing power parity of low-income inhabitants. Important 
indicator also shows the public perception degree of corruption (Legal). This index published 
on year basis of the company Transparency International assume points ranging between 0 
(high corruption) to 10 (without corruption) for each country. 
Indicator ALB_B shows average amount of credit for one debtor. If it is increasing in the 
market it is expected that the amount of clients and social efficiency will decrease. Another 
indicator Number_ln shows logarithm of total amount of debtors who have some kind of 
credit at MFI. Actual profit from credit portfolio (Yield_R) shows the amount of credits and 
fees from offered credits. To assess financial condition of microfinance sector, we also need 
to use the indicator PAR_90 that reflects the amount of risk credits after maturity longer than 
90 days. We can find a real danger here, as the credits will have to be deducted from MFIs 
credit portfolios. The last indicator is TE/TA shows whether MFIs are able to reduce the 
amount of total costs in the long term. 
 
5.2 MODEL 
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We will set general regression model 1 for variables mentioned above. There will be 
following variables on the left side: GDP, Inflation, Export, Urban_ln, Legal and ALB_B at 
the time t and in the country c. When examining the degree of efficiency we find out that it is 
useful to distinguish between amount and type of MFIs. Therefore we have to widen 
regressive equation by qualitative variables (dummies) Status, Outreach_L a Outreach_M. 
Variable Status will distinguish between profit and non-profit MFI. On the other hand, 
indicator Outreach_L and Outreach_M defines large and middle MFI.  
 
Ytc= α0 + β1GDPtc + β2Inflationtc + β3Exporttc + β4Urban_lntc + β5Legaltc + β6ALB_Btc + β7 
Statustc +  β8Outreach_Ltc + β9Outreach_Mtc + εtc.                                  (1) 
 
Other variables Number_ln, Yield_R, PAR_90 and TE/TA will be analysed on the right side of 
the equation (Ytc). The aim is to confirm whether macroeconomic environment together with 
selected variables of microfinance sector (properly speaking business strategy, type and 
amount of MFI) have an influence over quantity of debtors, profits from portfolio, risk 
operation and optimization of costs.  
 
5.3 FINAL FINDINGS 
 
Results of our panel regression are summarized in Table 2 and 3. For each mentioned 
variable, there is Fixed Effect (FE) mentioned and so is Random Effect (RE). Decision on 
choice between both types of models is supported by use of Hausman test that rejects method 
of random effects in its conclusions. 
Macroeconomic environment has positive impact on bigger amount of debtors 
(Number_ln) – especially in the area with increasing population in cities and with higher 
inflation rate. It is interesting on the other hand, that there is no influence of economy 
development on mentioned variable. Final findings in Table 2 confirm that higher degree of 
social efficiency is connected with type of MFI and non-growing amounts of provided credits 
(ALB_B).  
Negative impact on real MFIs profitability (Yield_R) manifests itself by growth of 
population and average amount of credit. It is given primarily by increasing competition on 
the market that presses interest rates down in the long term and by the problem of increasing 
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average amount of credit. It is no surprise that increasing price level also has negative impact 
on profit. 
Our simple illustrative panel regression confirms that sufficient growth of population in 
cities is connected with the growth of credits after maturity. Trying to reach better results, 
MFIs also resort to financing more dangerous projects that can endanger their future 
existence. On the other hand, decrease of risk credits is connected with the amount of MFIs 
and increasing amount of credits. The reason is that bigger MFIs are able to control the risks 
and by preferring more solvent debtors, it is possible to ensure bigger secure in repayment of 
credit in case of market upheavals. In the end, it is necessary to add that macroeconomic 
climate seems to have bigger impact on MFIs in region of Latin America and Caribbean, 
especially from the economic growth point of view, degree of corruption and inflation rate. 
The cause is probably prevalence of profitable MFIs that are more connected with the market 
and therefore even their business activities are more predisposed to macroeconomic 
development. 
Total costs represent the last observed area. Their decrease is connected with the amount 
of MFIs, with the growth of credits or with the openness of economy. On the other hand, it is 
becoming confirmed that the growing population result in bigger amount of debtors but also 
in increasing total costs. 
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Table 2: Final Findings for the Region of Latin America and the Caribbean 
  Number_ln Yield_R PAR_90 TE/TA 
  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant -44.8794*** 7.7948*** 420.092*** -84.1310*** -188.017* 15.7040*** 170.165* -58.6736*** 
  (0.000007) (0.000002) (0.00005) (0.000002) (0.0613) (0.0007) (0.0520) (0.000002) 
GDP 0.0013 -0.0073 0.1254 0.1108 -0.1770*** -0.2202*** 0.0412 0.0005 
  (0.7664) (0.1233) (0.1597) (0.1924) (0.0016) (0.0006) (0.5833) (0.9955) 
Inflation 0.0051* -0.0068* -0.8772*** -0.7525*** -0.2342*** -0.1967*** -0.0262 0.0913 
  (0.0674) (0.0592) (0.000007) (0.000003) (0.000008) (0.0001) (0.5852) (0.1530) 
Export -0.0012 0.0033* -0.0041 -0.0153 0.0047 0.0340 -0.1096*** -0.1033*** 
  (0.4574) (0.0795) (0.9092) (0.6492) (0.8621) (0.1817) (0.0060) (0.0019) 
Urban_ln 3.2099*** -0.0049 -23.3829*** 7.2286*** 12.1007** -0.4112 -8.7030 5.3323*** 
  (0.000002) (0.9026) (0.0002) (0.000002) (0.0497) (0.3184) (0.1042) (0.000003) 
Legal 0.0734 0.1972*** 0.4080 -1.2590** -1.7882*** 0.00003 1.2445 0.1472 
  (0.1450) (0.000002) (0.6130) (0.0478) (0.0076) (0.6603) (0.1242) (0.8124) 
ALB_B -0.00004*** -0.00003*** -0.0002** -0.0005*** -0.000002 -0.4599 -0.0004* -0.0007*** 
  (0.0004) (0.000007) (0.0211) (0.000003) (0.9797) (0.5175) (0.0535) (0.000003) 
Status 0.0645** 0.5670*** 5.6820*** 10.1713*** 1.3081** -0.4599 5.7062*** 5.6510*** 
  (0.0309) (0.000006) (0.000009) (0.000006) (0.0179) (0.5175) (0.000002) (0.0009) 
Outreach_L 1.3334*** 1.9850*** 0.6192 -2.4148** -2.8637* -2.0356*** -1.2514 -3.6933*** 
  (0.000009) (0.000001) (0.7301) (0.0197) (0.0994) (0.0014) (0.4889) (0.0002) 
Outreach_M 0.6978*** 0.9786*** 0.6157 -0.3191 -1.1696* -0.9944** -0.7819 -1.7001** 
  (0.000004) (0.000002) (0.5330) (0.6610) (0.0843) (0.0485) (0.4658) (0.0172) 
R2 0.9684   0.9251   0.5547   0.8979   
Hausman test 0.00008 0.00002 0.000004 0.00002 
Note: P-values are given in brackets below the coefficient estimates; *, **, *** represents level of significance 10 %, 5 % a 1 %. 
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Table 3: Final Findings for the Region of Asia 
  Number_ln Yield_R PAR_90 TE/TA 
  FE RE FE RE FE RE FE RE 
Constant -58.0041*** 5.7342*** 290.526*** 43.5187*** -433.114** -6.7685 -258.941** 12.7498 
  (0.000003) (0.000002) (0.0010) (0.000002) (0.0493) (0.3438) (0.0485) (0.1350) 
GDP -0.0078 -0.0254*** -0.0253 -0.0297 -0.1439 -0.2769* 0.1227 -0.0551 
  (0.2687) (0.0011) (0.7700) (0.7850) (0.2929) (0.0700) (0.3142) (0.6686) 
Inflation 0.0053* 0.0099*** -0.6343*** -0.7243*** 0.0046 0.0060 0.0311 0.0340 
  (0.0555) (0.0089) (0.000009) (0.000001) (0.9413) (0.9353) (0.6614) (0.5870) 
Export -0.0010 0.0022 -0.0122 -0.0186 0.0281 0.0455 -0.0245 -0.0026 
  (0.4764) (0.1897) (0.6049) (0.4215) (0.2478) (0.1652) (0.3649) (0.9231) 
Urban_ln 3.7988*** 0.1586*** -15.1185*** -0.7232 25.1869** 1.0212** 16.3941** 1.1765** 
  (0.000003) (0.0002) (0.0027) (0.1636) (0.0465) (0.0417) (0.0275) (0.0325) 
Legal -0.0269 0.1365** 1.5693* -1.3183 -1.4988 -0.9450 -1.7356* -2.3685** 
  (0.7063) (0.0489) (0.0756) (0.1715) (0.3750) (0.4522) (0.0942) (0.0350) 
ALB_B -0.00009 -0.000002 -0.0047** -0.0042*** -0.0038** -0.0019* -0.0034*** -0.0037*** 
  (0.3455) (0.9786) (0.0213) (0.000002) (0.0315) (0.0566) (0.0085) (0.0002) 
Status -0.1533 0.1217 -0.5126 -0.8495 -0.1089 1.5242 -1.4813 -1.0306 
  (0.2676) (0.2680) (0.6335) (0.5290) (0.7051) (0.1986) (0.4593) (0.4634) 
Outreach_L 1.6528*** 2.3658*** 1.2151 -0.3915 -6.2559** -2.9394** -7.9483* -5.3519*** 
  (0.000007) (0.000003) (0.3560) (0.6912) (0.0214) (0.0103) (0.0651) (0.000002) 
Outreach_M 0.8560*** 1.1613*** -0.6365 -0.6601 -3.1897* -1.6609 -5.6323* -3.9409*** 
  (0.000007) (0.000002) (0.4620) (0.4469) (0.0837) (0.1319) (0.0569) (0.00009) 
R2 0.9645   0.8661   0.5526   0.7486   
Hausman test 0.000002 0.000002 0.0353 0.0002 
Note: P-values are given in brackets below the coefficient estimates; *, **, *** represents level of significance 10 %, 5 % a 1 %. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Theoretical and empirical studies descried in this summarizing article confirm considerable 
microfinance sector development in developing countries. These studies show that rigid, state-
controlled, model of direct financing of the poor may be  replaced by MFIs that are able to 
finance business activities effectively by combining their own and other sources. Increasing 
competition and pressure on financial efficiency of MFIs is then positively reflected in wider 
portfolio of products and services to low-income inhabitants. 
However, our summary of present academic literature shows that the development of 
microfinance industry does not have clear conclusions from the social efficiency point of 
view. Many studies primarily point out insufficient choice of low-income debtors and 
departure from original intention which the microfinance were intended for. Academic 
literature also points out increasing instability of microfinance market, excessive pressure on 
financial efficiency, problem of risky operations and persisting financial illiteracy leading to 
overburdening of debtors. 
This article is far from providing thorough overview of all controversial topics about 
microfinance. That’s why we recommend the reader to focus also on further studies, 
especially on the topics that were not covered in this article, such as expediency of own 
financial sources, causes of decreasing the share of women in credit portfolios, reasons of 
different development of microfinance between regions, and macroeconomic influence on the 
development of microfinance sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 22 
REFERENCES  
 
AHLIN, CH.; LIN, J.; MAIO, M. 2011. Where Does Microfinance Flourish? Microfinance 
Institution Performance in Macroeconomic Context. Journal of Development Economics. 
2011, Vol. 95, No. 2, pp. 105-120. 
 
ARMENDARIZ, B.; MORDUCH, J. 2010. The Economics of Microfinance. 2nd edition 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010, pp. 1-468. ISBN 978-026-2014-106. 
 
ARMENDARIZ, B.; MORDUCH, J. 2000. Microfinance Beyond Group Lending. The 
Economics of Transition. 2000, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 401-420. 
 
ATKINSON, J.; DE JANVRY, A.; MCINTOSH, C.; SADOULET E. 2013. Prompting 
Microfinance Borrowers to Save: A Field Experiment from Guatemala. Economic 
Development and Cultural Change. 2013, Vol. 62, No. 1, pp. 21-64. 
 
BARRY, J. J. 2012. Microfinance, the Market and Political Development in the Internet Age. 
Third World Quarterly. 2012, Vol. 33, No. 1, pp. 125-141. 
 
BAUER, M.; CHYTILOVÁ, J.; MORDUCH, J. 2012. Behavioral Foundations of 
Microcredit: Experimental and Survey Evidence from Rural India. American Economic 
Review. 2012, Vol. 102, No. 2, pp. 1118-1139. 
 
BIENER, CH.; ELING, M. 2011. The Performance of Microinsurance Programs: A Data 
Envelopment Analysis. Journal of Risk and Insurance. 2011, Vol. 78, No. 1, pp. 83-115. 
 
BRAU, J. C.; WOLLER, G. M. 2004. Microfinance: A Comprehensive Review of the 
Existing Literature. Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance. 2004, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-27. 
 
BURAND, D. 2009. Microfinance Managers Consider Online Funding: Is It Finance, 
Marketing, or Something Else Entirely [Focus Note No. 54]. Washington, D. C.: CGAP, 
2009. 
 
COLEMAN, B. E. 2006. Microfinance in Northeast Thailand: Who Benefits and How Much? 
World Development. 2006, Vol. 34, No. 9, pp. 1612-1638. 
 
CHAHINE, S.; TANNIR, L. 2010. On the Social and Financial Effects of the Transformation 
of Microfinance NGOs. International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations. 
2010, Vol. 21, No. 3, pp. 440-461. 
 
CHEN, G.; RASMUSSEN, S.; REILLE, X.; ROZAS, D. 2010. Indian Microfinance Goes 
Public: The SKS Initial Public Offering [Focus Note No. 65]. Washington, D. C.: CGAP, 
2010. 
 
CULL, R.; DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, A.; MORDUCH, J. (forthcoming): Banks and Microbanks. 
Journal of Financial Services Research. 
 
 23 
CULL, R.; DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, A.; MORDUCH, J. 2011. Does Regulatory Supervision 
Curtail Microfinance Profitability and Outreach? World Development. 2011, Vol. 39, No. 6, 
pp. 949-965. 
 
CULL, R.; DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, A.; MORDUCH, J. 2009. Microfinance Meets the Market. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 2009, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 167-192. 
 
CULL, R.; DEMIRGÜÇ-KUNT, A.; MORDUCH, J. 2007. Financial Performance and 
Outreach: A Global Analysis of Lending Microbanks. The Economic Journal. 2007, Vol. 117, 
No. 517, pp. 107-133. 
 
D’ESPALLIER, B.; HUDON, M.; SZAFARZ, A. 2013. Unsubsidized Microfinance 
Institutions. Economics Letters. 2013, Vol. 120, No. 2, pp. 174-176. 
 
DEHEJIA, R.; MONTGOMERY, H.; MORDUCH, J. 2012. Do Interest Rates Matter? Credit 
Demand in the Dhaka Slums. Journal of Development Economics. 2012, Vol. 97, No. 2, pp. 
437-449. 
 
DE JANVRY, A.; MCINTOSH, C.; SADOULET, E. 2010. The Supply and Demand Side 
Impacts of Credit Market Information. Journal of Development Economics. 2010, Vol. 93, 
No. 2, pp. 173-188. 
DOKULILOVA, L.; JANDA, K.; ZETEK, P. 2009. Sustainability of Microfinance 
Institutions in Financial Crisis. European Financial and Accounting Journal. 2009, Vol. 2, 
No. 4, pp. 7-33. 
 
FERNANDO, N. A. 2006. Understanding and Dealing with High Interest Rates on 
Microcredit: A Note to Policy Makers in Asia and the Pacific Region. Asian Development 
Bank, 2006. 
 
GALAK, J.; SMALL, D.; STEPHEN, A. T. 2011. Microfinance Decision Making: A Field 
Study of Prosocial Lending. Journal of Marketing Research. 2011, Vol. 48, SPL, pp. 130-
137. 
 
GALEMA, R.; LENSINK, R.; MERSLAND, R. 2012. Do Powerful CEOs Determine 
Microfinance Performance? Journal of Management Studies. 2012, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 718-
742. 
 
GARMAISE, M. J.; NATIVIDAD, G. 2013. Cheap Credit, Lending Operations, and 
International Politics: The Case of Global Microfinance. The Journal of Finance. 2013, Vol. 
68, No. 4, pp. 1551-1576. 
 
GHALIB, A. K. 2013. How Effective is Microfinance in Reaching the Poorest? Empirical 
Evidence on Program Outreach in Rural Pakistan. Journal of Business Economics and 
Management. 2013, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 467-480. 
 
GHANI, U.; MAHMOOD, Z. 2011. Antecedents of Market Orientation in the Microfinance 
Industry of Pakistan. African Journal of Business Management. 2011, Vol. 5, No. 5, pp. 1822-
1831. 
 
 24 
GUHA, B.; CHOWDHURY, P. R. 2013. Micro-finance Competition: Motivated Micro-
lenders, Double-Dipping and Default. Journal of Development Economics. 2013, Vol. 105, 
pp. 86-102. 
 
GUTIÉRREZ-NIETO, B.; SERRANO-CINCA, C.; MOLINERO, C. M. 2009. Social 
Efficiency in Microfinance Institutions. Journal of the Operational Research Society. 2009, 
Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 104-119. 
 
HAMADA, M. 2010. Commercialization of Microfinance in Indonesia: The Shortage of 
Funds and the Linkage Program. The Developing Economies. 2010, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 156-
176. 
 
HARTARSKA, V.; SHEN, X.; MERSLAND, R. 2013. Scale Economies and Input Price 
Elasticities in Microfinance Institutions. Journal of Banking&Finance. 2013, Vol. 37, No. 1, 
pp. 118-131. 
 
HARTARSKA, V.; NADOLNYAK, D. 2007. Do Regulated Microfinance Institutions 
Achieve Better Sustainability and Outreach? Cross-Country Evidence. Applied Economics. 
2007, Vol. 39, No. 10, pp. 1207-1222. 
 
HARTARSKA, V. 2005. Governance and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. World Development. 2005, 
Vol. 33, No. 10, pp. 1627-1643. 
 
HARPER, M. 2012. Microfinance Interest Rates and Client Returns. Journal of Agrarian 
Change. 2012, Vol. 12, No. 4, pp. 564-574. 
 
HELMS, B. 2006. Access For All: Building Inclusive Financial Systems. Washington, DC: 
World Bank. 2006, p. 76-77, ISBN 0-8213-6360-3. 
 
HERMES, N.; LENSINK, R.; MEESTERS, A. 2011. Outreach and Efficiency of 
Microfinance Institutions. World Development. 2011, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 938-948. 
 
HERMES, N.; LENSINK, R. 2007. The Empirics of Microfinance: What Do We Know? The 
Economic Journal. 2007, Vol. 117, No. 517, F1-F10. 
 
HOLLIS, A.; SWEETMAN, A. 1998. Microcredit: What Can We Learn From the Past? 
World Development. 1998, Vol. 26, No. 10, pp. 1875-1891. 
 
HUDON, M.; TRACA, D. 2011. On the Efficiency Effects of Subsidies in Microfinance: An 
Empirical Inquiry. World Development. 2011, Vol. 39, No. 6, pp. 966-973. 
 
JANDA, K.; RAUSSER, G.; SVAROVSKA, B. (forthcoming): Can Investment in 
Microfinance Funds Improve Risk-Return Characteristics of a Portfolio? Technological and 
Economic Development of Economy. 
 
JANDA, K.; SVÁROVSKÁ, B. 2010. Investing into Microfinance. Journal of Business 
Economics and Management. 2010, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 483-510. 
 
 25 
JANDA, K.; TURBAT, B. 2013. Determinants of Financial Performance of Microfinance 
Institutions in Central Asia. Post-Communist Economies. 2013, Vol. 4, No. 25, pp. 558-569. 
 
JANDA, K.; ZETEK, P. (forthcoming): Macroeconomic Factors Influencing Interest Rates of 
Microfinance Institutions in Latin America and the Caribbean. Agricultural Economics. 
 
KAPOOR, M.; MORDUCH, J.; RAVI, S. 2007. From Microfinance to m-Finance. 
Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization. 2007, Vol. 2, No. 1-2, pp. 82-90. 
 
KARLAN, D.; ZINMAN, J. 2010. Expanding Credit Access: Using Randomized Supply 
Decisions to Estimate the Impacts. Review of Financial Studies. 2010, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp. 
433-464. 
 
KARLAN, D.; ZINMAN, J. 2008. Credit Elasticities in Less-Developed Economies: 
Implications for Microfinance. American Economic Review. 2008, Vol. 98, No. 3, pp. 1040-
1068. 
 
KHANDKER, S. R. 2005. Microfinance and Poverty: Evidence Using Panel Data from 
Bangladesh. The World Bank Economic Review. 2005, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 263-286. 
KNIGHT, T.; HOSSAIN, F.; REES, C. J. 2009. Microfinance and the Commercial Banking 
System: Perspectives from Barbados. Progress in Development Studies. 2009, Vol. 9, No. 2, 
pp. 115-125. 
 
KONO, H.; TAKAHASHI, K. 2010. Microfinance Revolution: its Effects, Innovations, and 
Challenges. The Developing Economies. 2010, Vol. 48, No. 1, pp. 15-73. 
 
KUMAR, K.; MCKAY, C.; ROTMAN, S. 2010. Microfinance and Mobile Banking: The 
Story So Far [Focus Note No. 62]. Washington, D.C.: CGAP, 2010. 
 
LAUER, K. 2008. Transforming NGO MFIs: Critical Ownership Issues to Consider 
[Occasional Paper No. 13]. Washington, D.C.: CGAP, 2008. 
 
LEATHERMAN, S.; GEISSLER, K.; GRAY, B.; GASH, M. 2013. Health Financing: A New 
Role for Microfinance Institutions? Journal of International Development. 2013, Vol. 25, No. 
7, pp. 881-896. 
 
LOUIS, P.; SERET, A.; BAESENS, B. 2013. Financial Efficiency and Social Impact of 
Microfinance Institutions Using Self-Organizing Maps. World Development. 2013, Vol. 46, 
pp. 197-210. 
 
MADER, P.; WINKLER, A. 2013. Rise and Fall of Microfinance in India: The Andhra 
Pradesh Crisis in Perspective. Strategic Change. 2013, Vol. 22, No. 1-2, pp. 47-66. 
 
MALLICK, D. 2012. Microfinance and Moneylender Interest Rate: Evidence from 
Bangladesh. World Development. 2012, Vol. 40, No. 6, pp. 1181-1189. 
 
MATIN, I.; HULME, D.; RUTHERFORD, S. 2002. Finance for the Poor: From Microcredit 
to Microfinancial Services. Journal of International Development. 2002, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 
273-294. 
 
 26 
MCINTOSH, C.; WYDICK, B. 2005. Competition and Microfinance. Journal of 
Development Economics. 2005, Vol. 78, No. 2, pp. 271-298. 
 
MCINTOSH, C.; JANVRY, A.; SADOULET, E. 2005. How Rising Competition Among 
Microfinance Institutions Affects Incumbent Lenders. The Economic Journal. 2005, Vol. 115, 
No. 506, pp. 987-1004. 
 
MERSLAND, R.; RANDØY, T.; STRØM, Ø. R. 2011. The Impact of International Influence 
on Microbanks’ Performance: A Global Survey. International Business Review. 2011, Vol. 
20, No. 2, pp. 163-176. 
 
MERSLAND, R.; STRØM, R. Ø. 2010. Microfinance Mission Drift?: A Resource-Based 
Approach. World Development. 2010, Vol. 38, No. 1, pp. 28-36. 
 
MERSLAND, R.; STRØM, Ø. R. 2009. Performance and Governance in Microfinance 
Institutions. Journal of Banking. 2009, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 662-669. 
 
MORDUCH, J. 1999a. The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from the Grameen 
Bank. Journal of Development Economics. 1999, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 229-248. 
MORDUCH, J. 1999b. The Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature. 1999, 
Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 1569-1614. 
 
MORDUCH, J. 2000. The Microfinance Schism. World Development. 2000, Vol. 28, No. 4, 
pp. 617-629. 
 
MOSLEY, P.; HULME, D. 1998. Microenterprise Finance: Is There a Conflict Between 
Growth and Poverty Alleviation? World Development. 1998, Vol. 26, No. 5, pp. 783-790. 
 
PORTEOUS, D. 2006. Competition and Microcredit Interest Rates [Focus Note No. 33]. 
Washington, D.C.: CGAP, 2006. 
 
QUAYES, S. 2012. Depth of Outreach and Financial Sustainability of Microfinance 
Institutions. Applied Economics. 2012, Vol. 44, No. 26, pp. 3421-3433. 
 
RANDØY, T.; STRØM, R. Ø.; MERSLAND, R. (forthcoming): The Impact of Entrepreneur-
CEOs in Microfinance Institutions. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 
 
ROBERTS, P. W. 2013. The Profit Orientation of Microfinance Institutions and Effective 
Interest Rates. World Development. 2013, Vol. 41, pp. 120-131. 
 
ROSENBERG, R. 2007. CGAP Reflections on the Compartamos Initial Public Offering: A 
Case Study on Microfinance Interest Rates and Profits [Focus Note No. 42]. Washington, 
D.C.: CGAP, 2007. 
 
ROSENBERG, R.; GAUL, S.; FORD, W.; TOMILOVA, O. 2013. Microcredit Interest Rates 
and Their Determinants 2004-2011. Access to Finance Forum: CGAP, 2013. No. 7, pp. 1-28. 
 
SANDBERG, J. 2012. Mega-interest on Microcredit: Are Lenders Exploiting the Poor? 
Journal of Applied Philosophy. 2012, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 169-185. 
 
 27 
SENGUPTA, R.; AUBUCHON, C. P. 2008. The Microfinance Revolution: An Overview. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review. 2008, Vol. 90, No. 1, pp. 9-30. 
 
SODOKIN, K.; DONOU-ADONSOU, CH. 2010. Banks, Microfinance Institutions and 
Economic Growth in the West African Economic and Monetary Union. African Development 
Review. 2010, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 495-510. 
 
VAN GOOL, J.; VERBEKE, W.; SERCU, P.; BAESENS, B. 2012. Credit Scoring for 
Microfinance: Is It Worth It? International Journal of Finance. 2012, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 103-
123. 
 
VANROOSE, A.; D’ESPALLIER, B. 2013. Do Microfinance Institutions Accomplish Their 
Mission? Evidence from the Relationship between Traditional Financial Sector Development 
and Microfinance Institutions’ Outreach and Performance. Applied Economics. 2013, Vol. 45, 
No. 15, pp. 1965-1982. 
 
WAGNER, CH. 2012. From Boom to Bust: How Different Has Microfinance Been from 
Traditional Banking? Development Policy Review. 2012, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 187-210. 
WAGNER, CH.; WINKLER, A. 2013. The Vulnerability of Microfinance to Financial 
Turmoil – Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis. World Development. 2013, Vol. 51, pp. 
71-90. 
 
WERNER, W. J. 2009. Micro-insurance in Bangladesh: Risk Protection for the Poor? Journal 
of Health Population and Nutrition. 2009, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 563-573. 
 
WOLLER, G. 2002. From Market Failure to Marketing Failure: Market Orientation as the 
Key to Deep Outreach in Microfinance. Journal of International Development. 2002, Vol. 14, 
No. 3, pp. 305-324. 
 
